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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellarnt, 
vs. 
L. V. SHIRE, doing business as Shire 
Motor Company, 
Defendant, 
BANK OF VERNAL, VERNAL, 
UTAH, a corporation, 
Garnishee and Respondent. 
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Attorneys for Appellants. 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SEABOARD FINANCE COMPANY, 
a corporation, 
Plaintiff and AppellOJnt, 
vs. 
L. V. SHIRE, doing business as Shire 
Motor Company, 
Defendant, 
BANK OF VERNAL, VERNAL, 
UTAH, a corporation, 




STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action involves a dispute between the Plain-
tiff and the Garnishee Defendant, Bank of Vernal, here-
inafter called ' ' The Bank. '' The appeal is on the judg-
ment roll only. A detailed statement of facts is contained 
in the Findings of Fact, Tr. No. 7 4-84. 
Briefly the essential facts are : 
Prior to the time of garnishment in this action the 
Defendant, L. V. Shire, became indebted to the Bank 
1 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
on three promissory notes, one for $11,270.00, one for 
$2,065.00 and one for $1,!l00.00. The $11,270.00 note was 
secured by a Trust Receipt and a Chattel Mortgage on 
five Frazer automobiles. rrhe note for $2,065.00 was un-
secured and the note for $1,500.00 was secured by a Chat-
tel Mortgage on automotive equipment. 
In the month of February, 1948, the Defendant, 
Shire, had a checking account in the Bank. On February 
17, 1949 without any authority from the Defendant, 
Shire, the Bank charged Shire's bank account with the 
sum of $2,783.17, and applied the same in reduction of 
the balance owing on the $11,270.00 note which was then 
owing by Shire to the Bank. On February 21, 1948, 
without any authority from the Defendant, Shire, the 
Bank charged Shire's account with the sum of $2,605.00 
and applied $1,800.00 of said sum on the $2,065.00 note 
and applied $805.00 of said sum on the $1,500.00 note. 
A Garnishment was served on the Bank on February 
24, 1948, but the charging of Shire's account as afore-
said depleted his funds in said account in said Bank. 
At the time of the service of the Garnishment the 
Court found that the Bank had in its possession a 1947 
Frazer automobile which was one of the automobiles in-
cluded in the Trust Receipt and Chattel Mortgage refer-
red to above, some accessories and miscellaneous auto-
motive equipment and a used Ford sedan. 
After the service of the Writ of Garnishment the 
Bank sold the Ford automobile and applied the net pro-
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ceeds in payment of the balance awing on the $2,065.00 
note. Thereafter the mortgage securing the $1,500.00 
note was foreclosed. The mortgage securing the $11,270.00 
note was never foreclosed. The interest of the Defendant, 
Shire, in the Frazer automobile was attached by the 
Plaintiff in this action and the Plaintiff and the Bank 
joined in the sale thereof for $1.~):35.00, which funds were 
retained by the Bank. 
The Court found that after the amounts realized 
from the sale of the two automobiles and mortgaged 
property that there was a balance of $163.58 in posses-
sion of the Bank subject to Garnishment. 
STATEMENT OF ERRORS 
The Trial Court erred in the following: 
1. In concluding that the Bank had the right to re-
tain the credits of the Defendant, Shire, in his checking 
account and apply the same in payment of the balance of 
his indebtedness to said Bank which remained after 
applying thereon the proceeds of the sale of the two 
automobiles and the remaining mortgaged chattels. 
2. In concluding that the sum of $163.58 only was 
subject to the Garnishment of the Plaintiff. 
3. In failing to conclude that the amounts which 
were charged against the Defendant, Shire's account and 
applied on the two secured notes were subject to the 
Plaintiff's Writ of Garnishment. 
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4. In entering a Garinshee Judgment against the 
Bank for the sum of 163.58 only. 
5. In failing to make and enter a Garnishee J udg-
ment against said Bank for the amounts which were 
charged against the bank account of the Defendant, 
Shire, and applied on the two secured notes of Shire 
which were held by the Bank. 
ARGUMENT 
All of the Assignments of Error have to do with one 
question, namely: when served with the Writ of Garnish-
ment did the Bank have the right to retain the credits of 
the Defendant, Shire, in its possession until it had ex-
hausted its security and apply said credits on the defi-
ciency owing by the Defendant, Shire, if any? 
This involves a construction of Section 104-19-13 of 
the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which reads as follows: 
''Every garnishee shall be allowed to retain 
or deduct out of the property, effects or credits 
of the defendant in his hands all demands against 
the plaintiff and all demands against the defend-
arnt of which he could have availed himself if he 
had not been s1tmmoned as garnishee, whether the 
same are at the time due or not, and he shall be 
liable for the balance only after all mutual de-
mands between himself and plaintiff and defend-
ant are adjusted, not including unliquidated dam-
ages for wrongs and injuries; provided, that the 
verdict or finding, as well as the record of the 
judgment, shall show in all cases against which 
party any counter claim is allowed, if any is al-
lowed, and the amount thereof." (Italics ours) 
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The key to the meaning of the ~tatute is found in the 
italicized portions above. To paraphase the wording of 
the statute, the Bank had the right to retain or deduct 
out of the property subject to Garnishment all of the de-
mands agaiw~t the defendant of ll'hich it could have avail-
ed itself if it had Hot been summoned as Garnishee· 
ll'hether the same were at the time due O'r not, and was 
liable to the Plaintiff after all muhtal demarnds between 
itself and the Defendant, Shire, were adjusted. 
Plaintiff contends the case of Zion's Savings Bank 
and Trust Company, vs., Rouse 86 Utah 574, 47 Pac. 2d 
618, is conclusive authority for the proposition that the 
secured notes of Shire held by the Bank were not ''de-
mands" which the Bank could have availed itself of "had 
it not been summoned as Garnishee,'' and that the check-
ing account and the secured notes were not such "mu-
tual demands'' which might be adjusted as contemplated 
by the statute. In the Rouse case, the Defendants therein 
had obtained three loans from the Bank, one in 1925, 
which was secured by a real estate mortgage, one in 1932, 
secured by a Chattel Mortgage, and one in 1933 secured 
by a Chattel :Mortgage. The proceeds of the 1933 loan 
were left with the Bank and without authority from the 
Defendants applied by the Bank in payment of the 1925 
loan which was then past due. The Bank then brought an 
action to foreclose the two Chattel Mortgages securing 
the notes of 1932 and 1933. The Defendants pleaded a 
Counter Claim to the Second Cause of Action, that of 
the note of 1933, for the sum of $857.00, which was the 
amount of the proceeds of the 1933 loan and which pro-
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ceeds had been taken by the Bank and applied on the 1925 
note which was secured by a real estate mortgage. 
The Court construed Section 104-55-1 of the Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, which reads in part as follows: 
''There can be hut one action for the recovery 
of any debt or the enforcement of any right secur-
ed by mortgage upon real estate or personal prop-
erty, which action must be in accordance with the 
provisions of this chapter . . . '' 
The Court referred to an earlier Utah case of Blue Creek 
Land & Livestock Co., vs. l{ehrer, 60 Utah 62, 206 Pac. 
287, which case held that a mortgagee can not levy a 
Garnishment or Attachment on property of the debtor in 
the hands of a third person without first exhausting its 
security and obtaining a deficiency judgment. The Court 
then held in the instal)t case that the Bank had no rights 
of off-set permitting it to apply the Junds in its posses-
sion on the secured note of 1925 before a deficiency judg-
ment was obtained. In discussing this proposition the 
Court said on page 619 : 
''From these derisions it would seem to fol-
low logically and naturally that a mortgagee, who 
could not reach by attachment or garnishment the 
assets of the debtor in the hands of a third party, 
could not for similar reasons apply personal 
credits in its own hands as an offset in reduction 
of the mortgage debt. 
"(3) The right of a bank to apply a deposit-
or's funds, held by it, to payment of his indebt-
edness, can exist only ·where each occupies the 
position of debtor and creditor, and where there 
exists mutual demands. 5 Michie, Banks and 
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Banking ~16. Both maturitv and mutualitY are 
t•~st•ntial to the validity of n ·setoff. · 
• • (-!) The status of the mortgage debt under 
a statute likP R. ~. Utah 1933, 104-5:>-1, construed 
as it has been hy this rourt, is somewhat analogous 
to one not yPt due, or one that lacks mutuality. 
True the debt is past due but the rreditor is not 
yet in a position to obtain personal judgment 
against the debtor or to proceed to satisfy the 
debt out of the debtor's assets other than the 
mortgag·ed property. Until the fund set up as a 
sec11rity for the debt is exhausted and the defi-
ciency, if any, is ascertained, the debts are on a 
differeut footing. They are not mutual personal 
obligat,;ons ll'hiclz may be set off against each other 
and compensated pro tanto." (Italics ours) 
The reason for the rule is stated by the Court on 
Page 620 in a quotation from 4. Cal. Jur. 270: 
"The reason of the rule which gives to banks 
the right to appropriate deposits for the payment 
of the debtor's matured indebtedness does not ap-
ply where the bank has security for that indebted-
ness. The ordinary presumption that it is the de-
positor's intent to have his note discharged from 
his deposit does not exist where the note is so 
secured. It has been said to be but reasonable that 
when the legislature declared that there should 
be but one action to enforce a debt secured by 
mortgage, it did not mean that payment could be 
enforced against the consent of the mortgagor by 
giving a bank the right to enforce payment under 
a general banker's lien upon some other property, 
and that, to, without any legal proceedings what-
ever. The rule, therefore, is that a mortgagee 
bank must first look to the mortgaged premises 
as constituting a prinwr~T fund out of which the 
dul1t secured },y the mortgage must l>c pai<l, and 
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that mortgage security must be exhausted before 
it can apply in reduction or cancellation of the 
debt any money on deposit with it belonging to 
the debtor." 
When the Bank of Vernal charged the Defendant, 
Shire's, account as it did, and applied the funds in pay-
ment of his secured indebtedness, Shire would have had 
a right to recover such funds from the Bank as did the 
Defendants in the Rouse case, supra. 
'11he Rouse case is conclusive authority for the pro-
position that as between the Defendant, Shire, and the 
Bank, the Bank had no right of setoff. What greater 
right of setoff, if any, did the Bank acquire through 
Garnishment? 
Broken down in its essential parts, the statute 
in question permits the Garnishee to retain or deduct out 
of the property garnisheed all demands of the Plaintiff 
and all demands against the Defendant: 
1. Of which the Garnishee could have avail-
ed himself if he had not been summoned as 
Garnishee. 
2. Whether the same are due or not. 
3. And shall be liable only after all mutual 
demands between himself and plaintiff and de-
fendant are adjusted. 
There are no demands claimed between Plaintiff and 
the Garnishee so this element may be eliminated. From 
the previous discussion of the Rouse case, supra, it is 
obvious that the Bank could not have availed itself of its 
secured demands, if it had not been summoned as 
Garnishee, which disposes of item ( 1), and likewise the 
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Rouse case holds that the serured indebtedness held by 
the Bank ag-ainst the Defendant, Shire, and his checking 
account in said Bank were not mutual demands which 
could be adjush'd behn'Pn the Defendant and the Bank, 
which disposes of item (3) above. The only enlargement 
of the right of setoff created by the statute is found in 
item (2) in that it includes demands not yet due. This 
undoubtedly means that if the Bank had an unsecured de-
mand against the Defendant which was not due at the 
time of the Garnishment it could nevertheless offset the 
same against the funds garnisheed. However, in refer-
ring to demands not yet due the statute can not be said 
to include secured obligations because there is no de-
mand, as such, in existence prior to the time the secur-
ity is exhausted and a deficiency judgment is obtained. 
In the case of the secured obligation there is only a pros-
pective possibility of a demand which may or may not 
arise the future, depending on whether the security is 
sufficient to satisfy the obligation. 
To contend that part number (2) of the statute as 
set forth above includes a secured obligation prior to 
deficiency judgment is to confuse an unmatured existing 
demand with the question of whether or not a demand 
exists at all. We have no doubt but what the Legisla-
ture intended to include a demand which was then in exis-
tence but not yet due rather than the prospective possi-
bility of a demand which might never come into existence. 
Therefore the enlargement of the right of setoff granted 
by the statute does not include the secured obligations 
owing by the Defendant, Shire, to the Bank. 
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There is no hardship or inequity in such an inter-
pretation as stated in Zollman in his work on Banks 
and Banking, Paragraph 4542, which reads as follows: 
"The taking of collateral security for a note 
is inconsistent with the theory upon which a 
setoff, or banker's lien is founded. The bank by 
accepting the note relies not on the general bal-
ance of the maker, but on the security which he 
offers.'' 
The question before this Court was involved in the 
case of Walters, vs., Bank of America, National Trust 
and Savings Association which went before the Supreme 
Court of California upon four occasions, and opinions 
are reported in 44 Pac. 2d 601, 52 Pac. 2d 232, 59 Pac. 2d 
983 and 69 Pac. 2d 839. 
In the Walters case the Plaintiff contended the bank 
had no right to setoff a secured indebtedness against the 
garnisheed funds and urged the same argument advanc-
ed by the Appellant herein. The Plaintiff in the Walters 
case cited Section 726 of the Civil Code of Procedure of 
California, which is the same in substance as Section 
104-51-1 of the Utah Code Annotated, 1943, and cited 
cases construing said section which upheld the same rule 
as that advanced by this Court in the Rouse case, supra. 
The bank in the Walters case, however, urged that the 
rule of the cases cited had been altered by the amend-
ment of Section 438 of the Civil Practice Act which pro-
vides that the right to maintain a counter claim shall not 
be effected by the fact that either the Plaintiff's or the 
Defendant's claim is secured by mortgage, or otherwise. 
10 
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Some of tlw Headnotes indicated that thP Court decided 
that the bank wns entitled to n sPtoff although the obliga-
tion was secured. Ho\H'Yer, an examination of the rase 
shows that the Court did not so hold, but held that the 
Plaintiff had waiYed its right of setoff. The Court did 
not make any decision as to what the effect of Section 
438 \Vas with respect to the rule of the cases cited. The 
Walters ease is important not for what the Court held, 
but because of what the Court did not hold. In other 
words, aside from the possible affect of Section 438, 
which provision is not contained in the Utah Law, the 
doctrine of the cases standing for the same proposition 
as the Rouse case, supra, was held to be applicable to a 
case of garnishment and was not disturbed. 
In our search of the authorities we have found no 
case in which a setoff of a secured indebtedness against 
garnisheed funds was allowed in states which follow the 
rule that there shall be but one action for the recovery of 
a secured indebtedness. 
The Appellant therefore respectfully urges thti:s 
Court to set aside the Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
of the trial Court and to make Conclusions of Law and 
Judgment in favor of the Plaintiff and against the Bank 
of Vernal f.or the amounts charged by the Bank against 
the Defendant Shire's, account and applied upon its 
secured indebtedness. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROMNEY AND BOYER, 
Attorneys for Appellants. 
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